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No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS. By Michael Kent Curtis. Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press. 1986. Pp. xii, 275. $24.95. 
In No State Shall Abridge, Michael Kent Curtis1 examines the his-
torical underpinnings of a doctrine which is increasingly under attack 
as lacking historical support: the incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
by the fourteenth amendment. In its barest form, Curtis's claim is that 
the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended that the states be 
bound to respect all of the individual liberties which, prior to the Civil 
War, had been protected against only federal invasion. According to 
Curtis, the framers expressed this thought not in the due process 
clause, but rather by providing that "[n]o State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States."2 
The argument that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the 
guaranties of the Bill of Rights and applied them to the states is not 
new.3 It came closest to being embraced by a majority of the Supreme 
Court in Adamson v. California. 4 Justice Black's dissent in that case5 
included an extensive investigation of the congressional history of the 
amendment and concluded that incorporation was intended by the 
framers. 6 Three of his brethren agreed. 7 Two years later, however, an 
immensely influential article by Professor Charles Fairman appeared 
refuting Justice Black's reading of history. 8 Since that time many 
1. Partner, Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James & Harkavy, Greensboro, North Carolina. 
A.B. 1964, University of the South; J.D. 1969, University of North Carolina. Mr. Curtis has 
written extensively on the incorporation of the Bill of Rights by the fourteenth amendment. 
2. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
3. In fact, Curtis's particular version of the incorporation doctrine - that it was intended by 
the privileges and immunities clause rather than the due process clause - was rejected by the 
Supreme Court in a line of post·Civil War cases beginning with the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873). Curtis devotes an entire chapter to his criticism of these decisions. 
Pp. 171-96. 
4. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
5. 332 U.S. at 68 (Black, J., dissenting). 
6. Justice Black did not rely on any particular clause of the amendment. Instead, he asserted 
that incorporation followed from "the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, 
and as a whole." 332 U.S. at 71. 
7. Justice Douglas joined in Black's dissent, 332 U.S. at 92. Justice Murphy, with whom 
Justice Rutledge concurred, voiced "substantial agreement" with Justice Black, 332 U.S. at 123. 
However, Justice Murphy wrote separately to voice his opinion that while the fourteenth amend-
ment did indeed incorporate the Bill of Rights, it was not "necessarily limited by the Bill of 
Rights." 332 U.S. at 124. 
8. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 
5 (1949). 
1188 
April-May 1987] The Federal Courts and the Constitution 1189 
commentators have conceded the historical debate to Fainnan.9 
Curtis, however, challenges that concession. Curtis expands the 
historical inquiry beyond the congressional debates to the entire his-
torical context of the amendment, a crucial part of which was "the 
relation between the concern for the protection of civil liberties and 
the crusade to abolish slavery" (p. 29). The amendment, he asserts, 
was primarily a product of the Republican-led antislavery crusade 
which preceded the Civil War. Although this crusade had as its im-
mediate aim the protection of black slaves in the South, it created a 
backlash hallmarked by repression of free blacks in the North and 
white abolitionists in the South (p. 31). In "declar[ing] an antislavery 
constitutional interpretation" (p. 6), the Republican framers were 
strongly influenced by what they regarded as the unconstitutional dep-
rivation by many states of the fundamental liberties embodied in the 
Bill of Rights. 
The debate over the effect of the fourteenth amendment, says Cur-
tis, is "really a question of the meaning of language" (p. 12). How-
ever, he cautions that the language must be read in its historical 
context. Thus he proposes to interpret the amendment in light of its 
language, the abuses that produced it, the political and legal philoso-
phy of those who proposed it, and the statements made by leading 
proponents in the congressional debates (pp. 12-13). After setting 
forth these ground rules for the interpretative quest, Curtis proceeds 
to examine each step in the amendment process. 
Focusing first on the decades leading up to the Civil War (pp. 18-
56), he notes that the denials of the rights of speech and press that 
resulted from attempts to silence abolitionists in the South effectively 
prevented the Republican party from campaigning there at all. Even 
in the North, the Supreme Court's decisions in the fugitive slave 
cases10 effectively prevented states from protecting the constitutional 
liberties of their own free black residents. This history convinced 
Republicans that "slavery [was] fundamentally incompatible with a 
free society. Its survival required eliminating the basic liberties of all 
citizens, white as well as black" (p. 36). 
Armed with this understanding of the motivations of the various 
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, Curtis examines the congres-
sional debates in meticulous detail (pp. 57-91). Here he finds coher-
ence where others found only confusion. Curtis then analyzes some of 
the historical arguments against incorporation, criticizing Fairman 
and the modem proponent of his views, Raoul Berger, 11 for failing to 
9. P. 92. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 711-12 (1975). 
10. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
11. Mr. Curtis has been engaged in an on-going debate with Professor Berger over incorpora-
tion. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A 
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attach any significance to the fact that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment 
was a Republican amendment. It was opposed by the mass of Demo-
crats. But Fairman regularly found the Democrats to be the people 
who had a clear understanding of the Bill of Rights question. Republi-
cans, he said, were confused" (p. 100; footnote omitted). Curtis con-
cedes that prevailing Republican legal thought could only be 
characterized as "unorthodox" (p. 52) in light of earlier Supreme 
Court pronouncements.12 However, he argues that it was precisely the 
point of the fourteenth amendment to overrule these earlier Supreme 
Court decisions and secure the status of orthodoxy for Republican 
views of civil liberty. "Although [Fairman's] analysis probably accu-
rately reflects the state of constitutional law in 1866, it ignores a Re-
publican consensus on the proper interpretation of the Constitution" 
(p. 109). Of course, if Curtis is correct in assessing the Republican 
consensus of 1866, then he certainly seems justified in treating prior 
precedent as irrelevant to the proper interpretation of the amendment. 
As impressive as Curtis's historical evidence is, he is vulnerable to 
the charge that he relies on Republican statements of intent to the 
exclusion of all others. However, while Curtis draws little support 
from members of the Democratic minority, he compensates for this 
flaw to some extent by his citation to a wide variety of sources - from 
Blackstone (p. 64) to Cardozo (pp. 199-200) - for the proposition 
that the phrase "privileges and immunities" has been used before and 
after the drafting of the fourteenth amendment to include our most 
cherished rights. Certainly, this is what some of the Republicans 
meant, and none of the other congressmen challenged this interpreta-
tion.13 Thus, the argument is not simply that Republicans intended 
that the fourteenth amendment apply the Bill of Rights to the States, 
but that they said so by choosing language that any contemporary -
even from the opposing party - would have understood to have that 
meaning. 
Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 45 (1980); Berger, Incorporation of the Bill 
of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981); Curtis, 
Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill 
of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982); Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to 
Michael Curtis' Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983). 
12. Republicans repeatedly stated that the Bill of Rights prohibited certain state actions, in 
spite of the Supreme Court's conclusion to the contrary in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 
243 (1833). 
13. P. 91. "John Bingham, the author of the amendment, and Senator Howard, who man-
aged it for the Joint Committee in the Senate, clearly said that the amendment would require the 
states to obey the Bill of Rights. Not a single senator or congressman contradicted them. • •• 
Today, the idea that states should obey the Bill of Rights is controversial. It was not controver-
sial for Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress." P. 91 (emphasis in original). 
Curtis points out that it would be inaccurate to have used the phrase "Bill of Rights," be-
cause "the rights of American citizens include, but are not limited to, those in the Bill of Rights." 
P. 219. See also note 7 supra (discussing Justice Murphy's similar view expressed in his dissent in 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947)). 
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In the remaining chapters, Curtis chronicles the treatment which 
the amendment received after it was drafted: before the states during 
ratification (pp. 131-53), in congressional attempts at enforcement (pp. 
154-70), and before the courts (pp. 171-211). The events described in 
these later chapters provide further support for Curtis's arguments; 
however, they make the book considerably less readable without ap-
preciably enhancing the cogency of the argument. This is the biggest 
problem with Mr. Curtis's otherwise excellent book. The main argu-
ments of the book are supported and developed continuously through-
out the book as Curtis moves laboriously through each stage of the 
drafting process. This choice of chronological rather than thematic 
organization relies too much on the sheer volume of Curtis's research 
and undervalues the importance of carefully structuring the arguments 
he advances. The result is that the considerable power of the thesis is 
at times obscured by the mass of evidence in its support. The chrono-
logical organization is probably unavoidable, but the thesis might have 
been communicated much more effectively if Curtis had spilled more 
ink in arguing from his evidence and less in merely presenting it. 
Since the Supreme Court has "selectively incorporated" most of 
the privileges and immunities in the Bill of Rights anyway, 14 one 
might reasonably question the relevance of the issue today. Curtis 
removes any such doubts by pointing to recent Supreme Court deci-
sions holding the states to a lesser standard in securing the guaranties 
thus incorporated.15 "The fact that a growing body of political opin-
ion is clamoring to free the states from federal protection of the guar-
anties of individual liberty contained in the Bill of Rights is a 
disturbing development" (p. 211). 
If it is disturbing to Mr. Curtis, it is just as encouraging to the 
current Attorney General of the United States. As Professor William 
W. Van Alstyne points out in a Foreword to the book, Mr. Meese has 
recently urged repudiation of the doctrine of incorporation (pp. vii-x). 
Moreover, "[t]he fact is that Mr. Meese's point of view does not stand 
alone; it is no late Reaganite novelty, and it has troubled some of the 
most serious scholars (and judges) of our constitutional history" (p. 
ix). 
If history is the field on which the interpretative battle will be 
14. Significantly, the Court has not settled upon a single rationale for doing so, as Professor 
Van Alstyne points out in the Foreword. P. ix. 
15. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 
(1972) (both upholding nonunanimousjury verdicts in state criminal trials); Williams v. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (state juries may consist of fewer than twelve jurors). The second Justice 
Harlan protested in Williams, 399 U.S. at 118, and in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 
(1968) (applying the right to a jury trial to the states). that the application of the Bill of Rights to 
the states would bring about a dilution of the guaranties in order to make it easier for the states 
to comply. It appears that this prediction was accurate. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 
(1973) (extending Williams' approval of juries of less than twelve to federal juries). 
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fought, then Mr. Curtis has made an invaluable contribution.16 Until 
now, few have taken issue on historical grounds with the Attorney 
General's contention that "nothing can be done to shore up the intel-
lectually shaky foundation upon which the [incorporation] doctrine 
rests" (p. viii). With No State Shall Abridge, however, Mr. Meese 
should be on notice that scholars are rising to the challenge. As Curtis 
writes, "The Court can change direction - if it chooses - and allow 
states to violate the Bill of Rights. It cannot, however, justify this 
result by a fair reading of history" (p. 211). 
- Mark A. Grannis 
16. Curtis acknowledges, however, that he is unlikely ever to gain an undisputed victory in 
the historical battle, due to the nature of historical inquiry: "In a real sense one can never prove 
that the amendment was designed to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. One can simply take 
the hypothesis and see how well it fits the evidence." P. 217. 
